Usage Control Model for Digital Rights Management in Digital Home Networks

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Abstract—The free distribution, unauthorized usage, and illicit sharing of copyrighted digital contents have become a common phenomenon with the rapid triple-play progress. The digital home network (DHN) is confronted with the open issue of digital rights management, and there is a lack of a formalized usage control model as well as some killer applications. The paper proposes a role-based cross-domain usage control model called the RCDUCM for DHN, which embraces two primary features of both role-based access control and security domain constraint management. RCDUCM is visually modeled by Unified Modeling Language to shorten the gap between the theoretical model and digital rights management applications. An application case denotes that the proposed model can implement consumer-contents-device license binding and transferring, the result of which is copyright protection of purchased digital contents against malicious piracy.

Index Terms—computer security, Digital Rights Management, formal model, Digital Home Network, copyrights

I. INTRODUCTION

The past few years have witnessed rapid developments in the fields of information technology and communications. There have been large-scale use and application of 3G/4G wireless mobile networks. Flexible and versatile network admission modes can enable a convenient connection “for anyone at any given time and anywhere” to existing and future digital resources. However, copyright infringements have also unfortunately increased alongside these rapid technological developments. For example, there exist the free distribution, unauthorized usage, and illicit sharing of copyrighted digital contents, including electric books, images, music, movies, and application software, mainly because of the ease with which these products can be duplicated while retaining high quality in their reproduction. These illegal practices negatively affect content protection and legitimate usage, and pose potential critical risks to the digital contents industry. Therefore, appropriate and efficient solutions are urgently needed, especially for eye-catching triple play in China. Digital rights management (DRM) refers to the right employed to cope with this controversial issue.

There are numerous and versatile digital devices in the digital home network (DHN) nowadays such as PCs, IPTVs, smart phones, PDAs, and MP3/MP4 players. General users want to play DRM content freely on their own devices, including the digital home network domain [1-3] and personal entertainment domain [4]. Reference [5] proposed the security domain architecture and corresponding protocols for DRM, but it did not support RO (Rights Object) transferring and content sharing. Consequently, Kim [1] improved on the above-mentioned architecture for a home domain, as well as the newly proposed LDM (Local Domain Manager) substituted Rights Issuer (RI) to accomplish the license distribution for domain membership devices. Meanwhile, the delegated RO and proxy certificate also realize the function of rights delegation. The scheme introduces a potential attack object, i.e., LDM, and increases some overheads. As far as the case wherein a consumer can purchase contents from different providers and share them on different devices is concerned, the introduction to Domain Issuer in OMA DRM instead of multiple Right Issuers is helpful in managing a sharing domain [6]. There remains, however, a lack of formalized usage control model and its visual modeling in DHN.

The paper proposes a role-based, cross-domain usage control model and its formalism, as well as highlights the corresponding visual modeling to shorten the gap between the theoretical model and some killer applications. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the authorization and delegation in DHN. Section 3 begins with the formalism of basic model components and defines the temporal properties and several constraint rules. Sections 4 and 5 address visual modeling and an application to the DHN system for DRM, respectively. The final section gives the concluding remarks and future research on secured protocols and security mechanisms.

II. RELATED WORKS

First, Rights Expression Language (REL) is employed by contents/rights providers to specify content usage policies, which involve a number of combined usage rules on rights/permissions under specified conditions and constraints [7]. Until now, there exist some specified REL (i.e., XrML [8], ODRL [9], and MPEG-21 [10]) that have gradually progressed and have been precisely represented in recent years. For example, the additional semantics of REL has been introduced by increasing new XML tags.
These constitute a primitive and underlying language that has such properties as flexibility, machine understandability, human readability, and expressivity. An unambiguous semantics is required to ensure that the REL-based rights specifications of copyrighted contents are non-conflicting. Besides, a framework for extensible DRM services by means of a simplified core REL was proposed based on the hierarchy DRM architecture [11]. Figure 1 illustrates the separation mode of core REL and associated data with rights management, which is accomplished by the upper application-level transactional interaction.

Some efforts have been focused on formal REL definitions such as the formal foundation for XrML and ODRL [12, 13]. The MPEG-21 REL ISO Standard with formal depictions was published in the realm of the multimedia contents industry [11]. Jamkhedkar proposed a formalized core model of digital rights as a basis of generic REL and clearly presented the map relations between the novel model and the above-mentioned XrML, ODRL, and Creative Commons License [14]. Due to the lack of formalized semantics of OMA REL, Reference [15] employed an executable algebra language called CafeOBJ to resolve the disadvantage, the main goal of which is to come up with automatic tools for the checking of the behavior of license sets. Sheppard discussed the issue on translation between XML-REL and virtual machine programs. A novel concept, Rights Expression Compiler, which is used for REL’s formalized definitions and precise translations, was correspondingly proposed [16]. For the validation of digital rights, Sachana implemented an effective method for checking rights consistency [17, 18].

Second, some studies have ever conducted on a general usage control model and its capability or temporal-spatial extensions when typical DRM applications were introduced. A Usage Control basic framework, which integrated Authorization-oBligation-Condition and was also called UCONABC [19]. Figure 2 (a) showed 4 combinations of UCONABC models about the Authorization, oBligation and Condition, and Figure 2 (b)-(d) illustrated 16 possible basic UCONABC models, where a notation of ‘0’ denotes the case that all attributes are immutable, and one of ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ presented the updates of some mutable attributes may happen before (pre), during (ongoing), or after (post) the rights is exercised, respectively.

Muhlbauer [21] improved the traditional rights controls based on proposed location constraints by which consumers can access sensitive data resources with a spatial change in mobile terminals. In the scheme, a non-instantaneous display usage control was realized based on MPEG-21 REL in combination with HTTP-HELD protocol-supported and trusted location services. In addition, a complicated technical category of non-instantaneous access control was presented in his contributions. Interestingly, the issue of reply attack of rights object, including such dynamic rights as play period, print count, and expire time, was addressed in [22]. There is a novel mechanism for controlling and managing usage of consumable rights, which is a vital motivator to prevent malicious users from reusing an expired “old license” through backup, especially among domain devices.

Third, regarding usage control applications in DHN, a DRM system for the home network, which is based on the ID-based public key system and group signature protocol, was presented to enable access control of contents and protection of domain privacy by the anonymity characteristic of group signature [23]. Reference [24] introduced an Onion Policy Administration (OPA)-based DRM model by which both content creators and distributors can configure license with traceability; this leads to greater efficiency and security of rights sharing.
Bhatt et al. developed a Personal DRM prototype of the Motorola E680i smart mobile phone [25]. Using the novel terminal, end consumers can set the digital license and flexibly transfer this among devices, resulting in personal content sharing. On temporal rights sharing, Lee made an interesting investigation on a re-distribution approach and secured protocol among front-end user devices. The effort is of significance in the extension of digital rights sharing [26]. Feng and Tang adopted Ergodic Encryption and machine authentication to share purchased license, significantly reducing the overhead due to dependence on the authorized domain [27].

The main disadvantage of the above-mentioned related works, however, is the lack of a generic, formalized model for DRM-enabling DHN. For this, the paper’s main contribution is to propose a formalized model with several primary characteristics such as cross-domain security management, usage constraint rules, and rights transferring.

III. FORMALIZED ROLE-BASED, CROSS-DOMAIN USAGE CONTROL MODEL FOR DHN

A. Basic Components

To implement an effective usage control in DHN with versatile digital devices and multiple usage permissions on digital contents, a novel role-based, cross-domain usage control model called the RCDUCM for DHN was proposed based on role-based access control in combination with security domain management. The model embraces the indispensable usage constraints on intra-domain and inter-domain authorizations. The RCDUCM for DHN is composed of several basic components such as consumer, functionality role, device, and usage permission as shown in Figure 4.

Definition 1 (Consumer, C): It is an active entity that is intended to gain access to the purchased or shared digital contents in DHN. As a generic user, it is subdivided into two subsets, namely, Purchaser and Sharer.

\[ C = \{c | c \in \text{Purchaser} \lor c \in \text{Sharer}\} \]

Definition 2 (Devices & Domain): The former is a platform set commonly specified as digital devices or consumer electronics by which a consumer can render or use digital contents. The later is a set of a group of devices, and it is called Security Domain (SD) when these devices are consistent with needed security requirements and goals. Otherwise, the domain belongs to General Domain (GD) which is not involved with security requirements and implementations.

\[ \forall d (d \in D) = \{de_1, de_2, ..., de_n \} \in De \]

\[ \forall sd (sd \in D) = \{de_1, de_2, ..., de_m \} \in De, \text{ security goal } (de_i) \}

Definition 3 (Functionality Role, FR): It denotes an abstract kind of consumers with the same usage requirements for a security domain. Further, Active Role (AR) is the only effective role for consumer in a usage session, where c represents access to digital content objects.

\[ FR \in 2^C, ar \in FR(c) \in C \]

Definition 4 (Usage Permission, UP): It is formalized as an authorized operation available in an RO set for a security domain, including reading, writing, playing, pre-playing, license transferring, sharing, and so on.

\[ \forall ro (ro \in RO) = \{up_1, up_2, ..., up_n \} \in UP \}

Definition 5 (Set Relationship): There exist several important relationships in the RCDUCM for DHN as follows:

CFRA \subseteq C \times FR : It is a multiple-to-multiple assignment relationship between C and FR.

\[ ARE \subseteq C \times AR : \text{Active Role Enabling (ARE)} \text{ is a}\]

one-to-one function.

FRDeA \subseteq FR \times De : There exists a multiple-to-multiple assignment relationship, and it is a bidirectional function.

\[ DeUPA \subseteq De \times UP : \text{The multiple-to-multiple binding relation}\]

ship indicates the assignment of usage permission(s) to a certain device.

Definition 6 (Consumer Functionality Role Assignment, CFRA): The authorization is a triple-tuple (c, fr, constraints), and it denotes that c would acquire fr when the assignment conditions are consistent with pre-defined constraints rules.

Definition 7 (Usage Control of RCDUCM): The control is an authorization assignment formalized as a six-tuple (ci, frj, dek, upm, RTL, constraints), where ci is a consumer, frj is a functionality role, dek is a rendering device, upm is a usage permission, and Role Time Limit (RTL) is the limitation of periodic or piecewise role action time. The semantic denotes that a generic user ci is assigned by the DHN administrator to a role frj. This role has the whole explicit and implicit operation permission upm on a consumer electronics device dek, in the prerequisite conditions of RTL and constraints.

C. Temporal Properties for the Functionality Role

Definition 8 (RTL): The RCDUCM for DHN has a time limitation property, RTL = \{x | x=[\tau bi, \tau ei] \ (i=1,2...n)\}, where \tau bi is the begin time , and \tau ei is the end time.
Definition 9 (States Set): Role states set $S = \{\text{init, invoke, sleep, expire}\}$, init is the beginning state, invoke is the active state, sleep is the sleepy state, and expire is the exiting state. Role’s expire status is not equal to role revocation. If RTL expires, $fr$ can set RTL afresh or be revoked.

Definition 10 (State Transitions in RTL): Let ST be a system time:

$$\forall i (i \in N) \ ST \not\in \{\tau_{bi}, \tau_{ei}\} \land ST < \tau_{bi} \rightarrow S=\text{init};$$

$$\forall i (i \in N) \ ST \in \{\tau_{bi}, \tau_{ei}\} \rightarrow S=\text{invoke};$$

$$\forall i (i \in N) \ ST \not\in \{\tau_{bi}, \tau_{ei}\} \land (ST > \tau_{bi}) \land (ST < \tau_{en}) \rightarrow S=\text{sleep};$$

$$\forall i (i \in N) \ ST \in \{\tau_{bi}, \tau_{ei}\} \land (ST > \tau_{bi}) \land (ST < \tau_{en}) \rightarrow S=\text{expire}.$$

D. Usage Constraints in the Security Domain

The RCDUCM for DHN strengthens usage permission assignments and management only in SD, not to GD, to prevent pirates from acquiring illegal usage licenses of digital contents. The essential rules include the non-conflicting constraint and cardinality constraint on several elements of FR, UP, and De, which are defined as follows:

Definition 11 (Conflicting Functionality Role): Two functionality roles $fr_i$ and $fr_j$ are conflicting roles if they are not assigned to a consumer $c_i$ at the same time in any security domain and if both are not sponsored in any session, as formalized by $\text{Cofl}_{\text{FR}}(fr_i, fr_j, c_i)$.

Definition 12 (Conflicting Usage Permission): Two usage permissions $up_i$ and $up_j$ are conflicting permissions if they are not assigned to a general consumer $c_i$ simultaneously in any security domain, as defined by $\text{Cofl}_{\text{UP}}(up_i, up_j, c_i)$.

Constraint Rule 1 (FR/UP Constraints, FRC/UPC): Any two functionality roles or usage permissions that do not refer to the above assignment conflict with the FR and UP sets.

$$\forall fr_i, fr_j (fr_i, fr_j \in FR, c_i \in C) \ \text{Cofl}_{\text{FR}}(fr_i, fr_j, c_i) = \text{False}$$

$$\forall up_i, up_j (up_i, up_j \in UP, c_i \in C) \ \text{Cofl}_{\text{UP}}(up_i, up_j, c_i) = \text{False}$$

Constraint Rule 2 (Devices Cardinality Constraint, DeCC): The number of any consumer’s devices does not exceed its pre-defined cardinality in any security domain, where the device’s cardinality denotes the maximum number of the consumer’s owned devices. $\text{Card}(c_i, de_j, sd_i) = \text{Max}(de \mid c_i \text{ and any security domain } sd_i)$

Constraint Rule 3 (Intra/Inter-Domain Constraint): Intra-domain constraint is independently effective only in any security domain, including FRC, UPC, and DeCC, whereas inter-domain constraints have a mutual effect on FRC, UPC, and DeCC. For instance, there is a user who merely has access to the minimum of devices’ cardinality constraints when two or more security domains intersect. $\text{Card}(c_i, de_j, sd_m, \ldots, sd_a) = \text{Min} \{\text{Max}(de \mid c_i \text{ and any security domain } sd_i) \land \text{Intersect}(sd_m, \ldots, sd_a)\}$

Property 1 (Mandatory Revocation from the System): If the system time exceeds the RTL of $fr$ or if other requisite conditions change, the RCDUCM for the DHN system would automatically revoke the authorizations, including all explicit and implicit usage permissions. The revocation would only affect intra-domain constraints.

Property 2 (Mandatory Revocation from the Administrator): If the DHN environments or the requisite usage conditions change, the RCDUCM for the DHN system administrator can discretionally revoke the authority, including all explicit and implicit usage permissions. The revocation would be effective for both intra-domain and inter-domain constraints.

IV. VISUAL MODELING OF THE RCDUCM FOR DHN

A. Static Visual Modeling

The Object-Oriented Method is helpful in analyzing and designing object-oriented application systems using such main concepts as object, class, inheritance, encapsulation, aggregation, message transfer, and polymorphism. A visual modeling of the DHN usage control system adopting the object-oriented thinking and Unified Modeling Language shortens the gap between the abstract theoretical model and application implementations, further guiding the development and deployment of typical DRM applications based on the proposed model.

With regard to the static modeling of the RCDUCM for DHN, a use case diagram and entity class relationship diagram are mainly represented. System functions are introduced from the user’s perspective using a use case diagram, as illustrated in Figure 5. Users are basically subcategorized into three kinds which fulfill different functionalities. The System Administrator manages the assignment of consumers, functionality roles, and usage permissions. The Security Officer takes charge of defining intra-domain and inter-domain constraint rules, thus carrying out FRC, UPC, and DeCC, as well as tracking and auditing the whole operations of the System Administrators’ authorizations and managements. The General Consumer can access purchased or shared digital content resources.

Figure 5 Use case diagram of the RCDUCM for DHN

Some important entity class relationships, including their attributes and methods, can also be used to present the primary static features of the RCDUCM for DHN, as shown in Figure 6. These relationships mainly include...
generalization, aggregation, and association. Role class is
generalized into two subclasses: FR and AR. Constraint
class is also generalized into Functionality Role Constraint,
Usage Permission Constraint, Devices Cardinality
Constraint, Role Temporal Limitation, and Revocation.
These constraints have explicit effects on usage controls over functionality roles and usage permission assignments, respectively. In the association relationship, the cardinality characteristics between classes were presented such as many-to-many associations between consumer and functionality role classes, functionality role and device classes, device and usage permission classes, as well as one-to-one associations between consumer and active role classes. The class relationship between devices is a special aggregation into a domain through SD or GD.

Figure 6. Classes relationship diagram of the RCDUCM for DHN

B. Dynamic Visual Modeling

With respect to dynamic modeling, the interaction diagram and object behavior diagram are shown in Figs. 4 to 6. All dynamic features are not described because of the length limitation of the paper, but a functionality role assignment and usage permission assignment (binding) sequence diagram (a kind of interaction diagram) is shown. The system administrator’s CFRA and FRDeA are illustrated in Figure 7 and 8, respectively. In these two procedures, the corresponding constraints are implemented, and audit operations are also accomplished. The usage control of a generic consumer over digital contents is shown in Figure 9, in which the contents control, rendering, and auditing are represented in detail.

Figure 7. Sequence diagram of functionality roles assignment

Figure 8. Collaboration diagram of usage permissions assignment

Figure 9. Activity diagram of usage control over consumer’s rendering

V. AN APPLICATION CASE OF THE RCDUCM FOR DHN

For a usage control security subsystem for the DRM in a DHN application, the RCDUCM for DHN was employed, as shown in Figure 10. The architecture is composed of
consumer authentication, authorization, and usage control over digital contents. The authorization managements are mainly composed of centralized authorizations, usage control, and constraint rules management. In the application, the user is also categorized into system administrator, security officer, and general user using the basic security principle called Separation of Duty. In centralized authorization, the system administrator would assign a certain functionality role to a general user as a prerequisite for the above-mentioned constraint rules. The security officer administers the rule database according to self-defined, application-level security policies.

Finally, at a specific time, the user gains access to the contents using the binding or transferable usage permissions listed in the purchased license, which is the prerequisite for the above-mentioned constraint rules. The security officer administers the rule database according to self-defined, application-level security policies.

Second, the user is assigned a role that corresponds to the mechanism between the user and the security server. Authentication is especially deployed by a bidirectional authentication and authorization. The DRMC usage control subsystem of DHN. The authorization management and usage control server devices for home networks. Besides, as a generic formal usage control model for DHN, RCDUCM for DHN is consistent with the multimedia home networks standards or specifications available [28-30].

There is a specific procedure for a general user rendering purchased digital contents over one or more consumer electronics. First, the user is authenticated in the DRM usage control subsystem of DHN. The authentication is especially deployed by a bidirectional mechanism between the user and the security server. Second, the user is assigned a role that corresponds to the usage permissions listed in the purchased license, which depicts the content-device-consumer binding and transferring. Finally, at a specific time, the user gains access to the contents using the binding or transferable license, in realization of the usage control and sharing of contents. There is an intersection of the two security domains, namely, where the IPTV is located and a general domain. Note that Access Control and Decision Monitor makes the decisions on access requests based on valid authentication and authorization.

In the aspect of system overhead, owing to OMA DRM, as a general standard specification and scheme, is not well involved with authorization and usage control applications for DHN, its overhead is medium. Whereas, the system overheads of the representative DRM approaches, including Ref. [1]’s, Ref. [23]’s, and the proposed scheme, are larger compared with OMA DRM, owing to the deployments and configurations of cipher key management and usage control server devices for home networks. Besides, as a generic formal usage control model for DHN, RCDUCM for DHN is consistent with the multimedia home networks standards or specifications available [28-30].

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The RCDUCM for DHN is a general and comprehensive DHN-oriented usage control reference model supporting functionality role assignment, device binding, and constraint rules implementation. Our visual modeling presented static and dynamic characteristics, and the theoretical model and visual modeling are adopted in the application case with the result of the model validation. Future works should focus on secure DHN admission protocols and mechanisms, aiming at the integration of a DRM security framework as a whole.

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